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Abstract 
We study a two-stage duopoly game, where, at the first stage, firms choose if adopting or not a social responsibility label. The firm 
who adopts the social responsibility label (the ethical firm) has high marginal costs, while the firm who doesn’t adopt it (the standard 
firm), supports low marginal costs. After the first stage, each firm knows the choice made by its rival and, at the second stage of the 
game, chooses prices. Consumers are divided into two groups: the group of consumers who prefers buying the good by the ethical 
firm and the group of consumers who prefers buying the good by the lowest price firm. Depending on the difference between the 
high and the low marginal cost and on the proportions of the two groups of consumers, the game has two asymmetric or two 
symmetric Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria . Symmetric Nash Equilibria imply that both firms makes the same choice at the first 
stage of the game (both decide to be ethical or standard), while asymmetric Nash Equilibria imply  different choices at the first stage 
of the game: one of the two firms chooses to be ethical and the other standard. We analyzed the same model of Davies (2005)  
changing one of its assumption: the proportions of the two groups of consumers are not fixed a priori. With this new assumption, 
results of Davies (2005) are no more satisfied. In Davies (2005), ethical labeling cannot eliminate standard production when there are 
two firms and the marginal cost of ethical firm is higher than the marginal cost of standard firm: in equilibrium, one of the two firms 
always chooses to be standard at the first stage of the game. In our model (a duopoly where marginal cost of the ethical firm is higher 
than marginal cost of standard firm) instead it exists a condition on the model’s parameters such that ethical labeling, in equilibrium, 
can eliminate standard production: if that particular condition is satisfied, it exists a symmetric subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium 
where both firms chooses, at the first stage of the game, to be ethical. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last decades, an increasing rate of consumers is modifying its purchase decisions: 
consumers are becoming more attentive to the environment, to the labour conditions of workers 
and, more generally, to any social aspect concerning the production of goods. 
There are several local and international organizations which inform consumers about conditions 
of production used by firms, which organize boycotts and promote positive buying (the so-called 
“buycott”) with respect of that goods which are certified with a particular social responsibility label 
(hereafter SRL). One of the most famous example of international SRL is the International 
Fairtrade Certification Mark, which is an independent certification mark used in over 50 countries. 
To obtain the Fairtrade Certification, producers have to respect several productive standards 
(International Fairtrade standards) set by FLO International (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International). The Fairtrade standards “guarantee a minimum price considered as fair to producers. 
They provide a Fairtrade Premium that the producer must invest in projects enhancing its social, 
economic and environmental development. They strive for mutually beneficial long term trading 
relationships. They set clear minimum and developmental criteria and objectives for social, 
economic and environmental sustainability” (see http://www.fairtrade.net/generic_standards.html). 
Considering the national labels, there are several local SRLs born in several countries: an italian 
example of SRL is Valore Sociale (see http://www.valoresociale.it), in England one of the most 
famous SRL is instead the Ethical Consumer Best Buy Label (launched by Ethical Consumer 
Magazine, see http://www.ethicalconsumer.org/magazine/best-buys-label.htm). In Belgium, the 
Belgian Parliament has approved a law that promotes social responsible production. To reach this 
objective, a label is established for products brought on the market that respect several basic rights 
(see http://www.epsu.org/a/128). A great part of SRLs are enviromental labels (the so-called eco-
labels) which certifies if goods are produced with methods friendly to the environment; examples of 
eco-labels include the European Union’s Ecoflower, the German Blue Angel and the Nordic Swan. 
The recent growth of firms who are adopting SRLs is naturally due to an increasing demand of 
ethical products by a specific share of the consumers’ population (the share of “ethical” consumers) 
which is concerned about the methods adopted by firms in the production of goods. Ethical 
consumers differ from “standard” ones since they prefer paying a price sightly higher than the 
“standard” one to acquire a product with a SRL (hereafter an ethical good): in particular, it has been 
shown that ethical consumers prefer paying a price premium for a product that is known to be 
produced by methods friendly to the environment and to any other social aspect. As an example, in 
Biorner et al. (2004), authors found that “the Nordic Swan Label has had a significant effect on 
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consumers’ brand choices for toilet paper, corresponding to a marginal willingness to pay for the 
certified environmental label of 13-18% of the price…” (see Biorner et al., 2004).  
Ethical consumption may be seen as a source of product differentiation generated by the 
preferences of ethical consumers: in some oligopolistic markets, firms adoptes a SRL as a strategic 
variable to differentiate their products from rivals’ ones and gaining the ethical consumers’ share of 
the market. In the Industrial Organization literature, some recent contributions introduce ethical 
consumption and social responsibility labeling into the traditional product differentiation models. 
These works may be divided into two different branches: the first one who considers ethical 
consumption as a source of vertical product differentiation (see, as an example, Amacher et al., 
2004 and Uchida, 2007), and the second one who considers ethical consumption as a source of 
horizontal product differentiation (see, as an example, Becchetti and Solferino, 2003; and Conrad, 
2005). Both branches of literature analyze a duopoly game where firms has to choose if producing 
an “ethical” or a “standard” good and choose prices. The first branch of literature assumes that all 
the consumers are “ethical” in the sense that prefer buying the ethical good if ethical firm adopts a 
price lower or equal than the price of the standard one (vertical product differentiation); if instead 
the ethical firm adopts a higher price than the standard’s one, some consumers buy the ethical good 
while others the standard one depending on the willingness to pay (hereafter w.t.p.) of each 
consumer, where w.t.p. is represented by a parameter uniformly distributed on a closed interval. All 
the consumers have the same preferences represented by a unique utility function and it doesn’t 
exists a group of consumers which is not concerned with the methods adopted in the production of 
goods. The second branch of literature assumes instead that each consumer has a different level of 
ethical conduct which is uniformly distributed on a line [ ]0,1 . To a higher level of ethical conduct 
corresponds a higher level of social responsibility desired by consumers: the less ethical consumer 
is positioned on point 0 of [ ]0,1 , while the most ethical consumer is positioned at point 1. 
Consumers positioned on point 0 are the standard consumers while consumers positioned on point 1 
represent the most ethical consumers. This is the typical case of horizontal product differentiation 
as in a traditional Hotelling model.  
A work which is a combination of the two branches of literature is Davies (2005). In Davies 
(2005), consumers’ w.t.p. is uniformly distributed on a closed interval; consumers positioned at the 
lowest value of the w.t.p.’s interval prefer buying the lowest price good without caring about its 
social content, while consumers positioned on the remaining values of the w.t.p.’s interval 
constitute the group of the “potentially” ethical consumers: if the ethical firm practices a price 
which is lower or equal than the price of the standard firm, potentially ethical consumers buy the 
ethical good, if instead the ethical firm adopts a higher price than the standards one, it exists a share 
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of potentially ethical consumers which buys the standard good and a share which buys the ethical 
good, depending on the w.t.p. of each potentially ethical consumer. Since consumers are uniformly 
distributed on the w.t.p.’s interval, only a very small quota of consumers belongs to the group of 
consumers who prefer buying the lowest price good (i.e. only that consumers located on the lowest 
value of the w.t.p.’s interval), while the potentially ethical consumers represent the great majority of 
the consumers’ population: the two groups of consumers are then fixed in a given proportion.  
We analyze the same model of Davies (2005) changing one of its assumption. As in Davies 
(2005), we assume consumers’ population is split into two different exogenously given groups of 
consumers with different preferences: the group of convinced standard consumers and the group of 
potentially ethical consumers. Convinced standard consumers represent the group of consumers 
which is uncorcerned or simply uninformed about the methods adopted in the production of goods; 
they do not care if the purchased good is labeled with a SRL or not and, between products of the 
same physical characteristics, they prefer the lowest price good; potentially ethical consumers 
instead prefer paying a price premium for an ethical product, i.e. have a higher w.t.p. the ethical 
good than the convinced standards’ ones. However, differently from Davies (2005), we assume that 
the size of those two groups is not fixed a priori; as an example, the group of the convinced standard 
consumers may represent the majority (and not the minority as in Davies, 2005) of the consumers’ 
population. 
In our paper we assume a two-stage duopoly game where, at the first stage, firms choose, 
simultaneously and independently, if adopting or not the SRL. The adoption of the SRL is 
connected with a high marginal cost of production, while, a low marginal cost of production is 
connected with the absence of the SRL. This is due to the fact that the SRL represents the respect of 
an ethical code of conduct which the firm decides to adopt in the production of goods: as an 
example, we may think to the adoption of an enviromental friendly production system or to the 
respect of a minimum wage for workers. The goods produced by the two firms have the same 
physical characteristics but may differ in its social content represented by the presence or not of the 
SRL (the goods produced by the two firms are different in its social content if, at the first stage of 
the game, firms make different choices). Consumers recognize the ethical firm (the firm who 
chooses to adopt the SRL) by a logo posted on the package of its products which is not present on 
standard goods. After having observed the choice made by its rival (SRL or not SRL, i.e. high or 
low marginal costs), each firm chooses, simultaneously and independently, prices. If, at the first 
stage, firms make the same choices, then all the consumers choose the lowest price good, if instead 
one of the two firms chooses to be ethical and the other standard, then each consumer behaves 
differently depending on the share of the population she (he) belongs and on the prices adopted by 
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the two firms; in this last case, the pricing decisions of firms determine the shares of standard and 
ethical consumers, where the standard consumers are that consumers who decide to buy the 
standard good and the ethical consumers are that consumers who buy the ethical good. Since 
convinced standards and potentially ethical consumers’ have different utility functions, we obtain a 
different market demand function for each group of consumers: a demand function for standard 
consumers and a demand function for ethical consumers. We analyze the existence of Subgame-
Perfect Nash Equilibria and, assuming that the size of the convinced standard and potentially ethical 
consumers’ groups is not fixed a priori, we show that results of Davies (2005) are no more satisfied. 
In Davies (2005), the author shows that, in equilibrium, ethical labeling cannot eliminate standard 
production when there are two firms and the marginal cost of the ethical firm is higher than the 
marginal cost of the standard firm: in equilibrium, one of the two firms always chooses to be 
standard at the first stage of the game. In our model (a duopoly where marginal cost of the ethical 
firm is higher than marginal cost of standard firm) instead it exists a condition on the model’s 
parameters such that ethical labeling, in equilibrium, can eliminate standard production: if that 
particular condition is satisfied, it exists a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium where both firms 
choose, at the first stage, to be ethical. The paper is structured as follows: in section two we present 
the Model, in section three the Equilibrium Results, in section four the Comparative Statics and in 
section five the Conclusions. References and the Appendix end the paper.   
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2 THE MODEL 
 
2.1 The market 
The market is a duopoly. The set of firms is { },I e s= , where e is the ethical firm and s is the 
standard firm, with ,i e s=  and i IÎ . The good produced by the two firms is identical in its 
physical characteristics (goods are pefect substitutes) but may differ in its social content: the ethical 
firm is the firm who produces an ethical good (a good with the SRL), while the standard firm 
produces a standard good (a good without the SRL). 
Firms compete in a two stage game, where, at the first stage, each firm i chooses, simultaneously 
and independently, if adopting or not the SRL (the firm who decide to adopt the SRL is firm e while 
the firm who doesn’t adopt it is firm s). 
Different marginal costs of production are related to different choices of firms at the first stage: 
the adoption of the SRL implies a high marginal cost of production 0ec c= >  while the absence of 
the SRL implies a low marginal cost of production, 0sc = . Then: e sc c>  and e sc c c- = . The cost 
function of a generic firm i is defined as 
                                     ( )
  if firm  adopt the SRL ( )
0     if firm  doesn't adopt the SRL ( )
e
i i i i
cq i i e
C q c q
i i s
=ì
= = í =î
                  (2.1.1) 
where iq  is the output sold by firm i. 
After the first period, each firm knows the choice made by its rival, and, at the second stage of the 
game, each firm i chooses, simultaneously and independently, prices within the interval [ ),i ip cÎ ¥  
i I" Î . 
 
2.2 Consumers preferences and  individual firms’ demand functions 
We assume that the consumers’ population is split into two different groups: the group of 
“convinced” standard consumers ( )0,1csq Î  and the group of “potentially” ethical consumers 
( )1 0,1pe csq q= - Î . The group of convinced standard consumers prefer buying the product by the 
lowest price firm without caring about the social content of the purchased good; while the 
potentially ethical consumers prefer buying the ethical good.  
The utility function of a generic potentially ethical consumer pej qÎ  is represented by the 
following expression: 
  if consumer   buy an ethical good
      if consumer   buy a standard good
j
pe e
j
s
p j
u
p j
g s
s
ì -
= í
-î
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while the utility function of a generic convinced standard consumer csj qÎ  is given by: 
  if consumer   buy an ethical good
  if consumer   buy a standard good
ecs
j
s
p j
u
p j
s
s
-ì
= í -î
. 
jg  is the willingness to pay of a generic consumer j: if pej qÎ , then ( ]1,jg gÎ  which is the interval 
on which potentially ethical consumers’ willingness to pay jg  is uniformly distributed; if instead 
csj qÎ  then 1
jg = ; the w.t.p. an ethical good is higher for potentially ethical consumers than for 
convinced standards’ ones since potentially ethical consumers give a higher value to the ethical 
goods than to the standard ones; sp  and ep  are respectively the prices adopted by the standard and 
the ethical firm. Each consumer buys one unit of the good and s  is large enough to assure that each 
consumer obtains a positive utility 0ju ³  j"  whatever is the price adopted by firms. 
Moreover, we define the ethical consumers’ group as the share 0,e peq qé ùÎ ë û  of the potentially 
ethical consumers who decides to buy the ethical good, while the standard consumers as the share 
[ ]0,1sq Î  of the population who decides to acquire the good from the standard firm. Since each 
consumer buys one unit of the good, it will be 1e sq q= - . 
At the second stage of the game, the choice of the SRL is given and firms choose prices. 
Depending on the choices made by the two firms at the first stage of the game, there are the 
following two relevant cases to study: 
a) One firm decides to adopt the SRL, while the other doesn’t adopt it (i.e. both ethical and 
standard firm co-exists into the market):   and  0e sc c c= = . 
b) Both firms decides to adopt the SRL (i.e. both firms are ethical): ,  i ec c c i I= = " Î ; or both 
firms decides not to adopt the SRL (i.e. both firms are standard): 0, i sc c i I= = " Î . 
 
Case (a) 
If, at the first stage of the game, one of the two firms chooses to be ethical and the other standard, 
each consumer behaves differently depending on the group of the population she (he) belongs and 
on the prices adopted by the two firms.  
If firm e practices a price lower than firm s, e sp p< , all the potentially ethical and convinced 
standard consumers become ethical (i.e. buy an ethical good): all the potentially ethical consumers 
buy the ethical good since j e sp pg s s- > -  for each j (
jg s s>  and e sp p< ), while all the 
convinced standard consumers become ethical since e sp ps s- > - ; then: 1eq =  and 0sq = .  
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If firms e and s practice the same price e sp p p= = , all the potentially ethical consumers become 
ethical since j p pg s s- > - Û 1jg >  which is true by assumption ( ( ]1,jg gÎ ) while half of the 
group of convinced standard consumers becomes ethical and the remaining half standard, where this 
is due to the fact that all the convinced standard consumers are indifferent between the two firms: 
e sp ps s- = - . Then: 2 1 2 1 2e pe cs cs cs csq q q q q q= + = - + = -  and 2s csq q= . 
If instead e sp p> , all the convinced standard consumers becomes standard since s ep ps s- > - , 
while the potentially ethical consumers are indifferent between the two firms if 
j
e sp pg s s- = - Û
* s ep psg
s
- +
= , with * 1g >  since e sp p> .  
In particular, *g g³  and hence *  j pejg g q£ " Î  if and only if ( )1e sp p s g³ + - : all the 
potentially ethical consumers becomes standard and 1sq =  and 0eq = . If instead 
( )1s e sp p p s g< < + - , we have that *g g<  and the share of the potentially ethical consumers s.t. 
*1 jg g< <  buys the standard good while the share of potentially ethical consumers s.t. * jg g g£ <  
buys the ethical good. This means that, if ( )1s e sp p p s g< < + - , a share ( )
1
1
e sp p
s g
-
-
-
 of the 
potentially ethical consumers becomes ethical and the remaining share 
( )1
e sp p
s g
-
-
 of the potentially 
ethical consumers becomes standard; then: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11 1
e s e s
e pe cs
p p p p
q q q
s g s g
æ ö æ ö- -
= - = - -ç ÷ ç ÷- -è ø è ø
 and 
( ) ( ) ( )11 1
e s e s
s cs pe cs cs
p p p p
q q q q q
s g s g
- -
= + = + -
- -
. 
 
We can then define the ethical and the standard demand functions: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1                                             if  
1                                     if  
2
1 1           if  1
1
0                                         
e s
cs
e s
e
e s
cs s e s
p p
p p
q
p p p p p
q
q s g
s g
<
- =
= æ ö-- - < < + -ç ÷-è ø
( )   if  1e sp p s g
ì
ï
ï
ïï
í
ï
ï
ï
³ + -ïî
 and 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1                                            if  1
1            if  1
1
                                         if  
2
0                                     
s e
e s
cs cs e s e
s
cs
s e
p p
p p
p p p
q
p p
s g
q q s g
s g
q
£ - -
-
+ - - - < <
-
=
=
       if  s ep p
ì
ï
ï
ï
í
ï
ï
ï
>ïî
. 
 
The ethical and the standard profit functions are 
( ) { }
( ) { }
( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( ){ }
                                              if  max ,
1                                 if  max ,
2
1 1           if  max , max 1 ,
1
0     
e e s
cs
e e s
e
e s
e cs s e s
p c c p p c
p c p p c
p p
p c p c p p c
q
p
q s g
s g
- £ <
æ ö
- - =ç ÷
è ø
=
æ ö-
- - - < < + -ç ÷-è ø
( ){ }                                                    if  max 1 ,e sp p cs g
ì
ï
ï
ï
ï
í
ï
ï
ï
ï ³ + -î
 and 
( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
                                            if  0 max 0, 1
1      if  max 0, 1
1
                                      if  
2
0                       
s s e
e s
s cs cs e s e
s
cs
s s e
p p p
p p
p p p p
p p p
s g
q q s g
s gp
q
£ £ - -
é ù-
+ - - - < <ê ú-ë û=
=
                       if  s ep p
ì
ï
ï
ïï
í
ï
ï
ï
>ïî
. 
 
Case (b) 
If, at the first stage, firms make the same choices (i.e. both firms choose to be ethical or standard), 
then all the consumers (both the convinced standard and the potentially ethical consumers) choose 
the lowest price good, while, if firms adopts the same price, consumers are indifferent between the 
two firms and firms share equally the market: half of the consumers’ population buys the good from 
one firm and the remaining half from its rival. Each firm obtains the same individual demand 
function and the same profit function. 
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3 EQUILIBRIUM RESULTS 
 
3.1 Second Stage 
At the second stage of the game, the choice of the SRL is given and firms choose prices. To find 
the equilibria of the second stage we study separately cases (a) and (b). 
 
Case (a) – Stage 2 
Let’s analyze the profit functions of firm e and s to build the reaction functions of the two firms. 
 
Firm e: analysis and reaction funtion 
The profit function ep  is composed by four separate functions: 
- { }  if  max ,e e e sp c c p p cp = - £ < , which is represented by a segment increasing with respect of 
ep  if { }max ,s sp c p= , or by the point ( ) ( ), ,0e ep cp =  if { }max ,sp c c= . 
- ( ) { }1   if  max ,
2
cs
e e e sp c p p c
qp
æ ö
= - - =ç ÷
è ø
, which is represented by the point 
( )
( ) { }
( ) { }
,0                               if  max ,
,
, 1   if  max ,
2
s
e e cs
s s s s
c p c c
p
p p c p c p
p q
=ì
ï
= æ öí æ ö
- - =ç ÷ç ÷ï
è øè øî
. 
- ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( ){ }1 1   if  max , max 1 ,1
e s
e e cs s e s
p p
p c p c p p cp q s g
s g
æ ö-
= - - - < < + -ç ÷-è ø
.  
If ( )1sp cs g+ - > ,  ep  is represented by a section of a concave parabola intersecting the 
horizontal axis ep  at ( ), 1e sp c p s g= + -  and whose argmax is given by 
( )** 1 1
2e s
p p c s g= + + -é ùë û ; 
If instead ( )1sp cs g+ - £ ,  ep  is represented by the point ( ) ( ), ,0e ep cp = . 
- ( ){ }0  if  max 1 ,e e sp p cp s g= ³ + - , which is represented by an half line. 
 
Case (a.1): firm e 
If ( )1 0c s g- - £ , then ( ){ } ( )max 1 , 1s sp c ps g s g+ - = + -  (i.e. ( )1sp cs g+ - >  Û  
( )1sp c s g> - -  which is always satisfied). The segment ep c-  intersects the parabola at points  
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ep c=  and 
( )
( )
1
1
cs
e s
cs
p p
q s g
q
-
= -
-
 with 
( )
( )
1
1
cs
s s
cs
p p
q s g
q
-
- <
-
. 
The intersection 
( )
( )
1
1
cs
e s
cs
p p
q s g
q
-
= -
-
 lies on the increasing side of the parabola if 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1
0
1
cs cs
s s
cs
c
p p
q s g q
q
+ - + -
< = >
-
%  
while it lies on the maximum point of the parabola if s sp p= %  and on its decreasing side if s sp p> % . 
The price ep , in correspondence of which the value asssumed by ep c-  is equal to the maximum 
point of the parabola, is equal to  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1 2 1 1
4 1
s cs s cs
e
p p c R
p
q q s g
s g
- + - - + -é ùë û=
-
%  
with  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22 22 1 1 1 1cs csR c cs g q q s gé ù= - + - - - +ë û , where ep%  is a quadratic function of sp , 
represented by a convex parabola. 
In figure 3.1.1, we represent the four components of ep  when { }max ,s sp c p=  and s sp p< % . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.1 
 
**
ep  ep%  
( )**e epp  
c-  
c  
ep  
ep  0  
( )
( )
1
1
cs
s
cs
p
q s g
q
-
-
-
 
ep c-  
( ) 1
2
cs
ep c
qæ ö
- -ç ÷
è ø
 
( )1sp s g+ -  
                                            
sp
1444442444443  
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If s sp p³ % , profit function ep  has only a superior given by sp c-  and not a maximum point; if 
instead s sp p< % , ep  may have a maximum point or not depending on the difference e sp p-% : if 
0e sp p- <%  (i.e. s ep p> % ) then ep  has only a superior given by sp c-  and not a maximum point, 
while if 0e sp p- ³%  (i.e. s ep p£ % ) ep  has a maximum point ( )**e epp  and the argmax is given by 
**
ep . The difference e sp p-%  is represented by a convex parabola which intersects the horizontal axis 
sp  at points 
( )2 1
1
cs
s s
cs
p p
s g q
q
-
= ±
-
% , with 
( ) ( )2 1 2 1
1 1
cs cs
s s
cs cs
p p
s g q s g q
q q
- -
+ > -
- -
% % , 
( )2 1
0
1
cs
s
cs
p
s g q
q
-
- >
-
%  (by assumptions) 
and 
( )2 1
0
1
cs
s
cs
c p
s g q
q
-
< < -
-
%  (by assumptions). 
Then, in order to build the reaction function of firm e, there are two relevant cases to study: 
i. 
( )2 1
0
1
cs
s s
cs
p p
s g q
q
-
£ £ -
-
% ; and 
ii. 
( )2 1
1
cs
s s
cs
p p
s g q
q
-
> -
-
% . 
 
i.  If 
( )2 1
0
1
cs
s s
cs
p p
s g q
q
-
£ £ -
-
% , ep  has a maximum point ( )**e epp  and the argmax is given by 
**
e ep p=  since ( )**e e sp p cp ³ - . 
ii. If 
( )2 1
1
cs
s s
cs
p p
s g q
q
-
> -
-
% , ep  has a superior given by sp c-  since ( )**s e ep c pp- > . 
 
Case (a.2): firm e 
If ( )1 0c s g- - > , then it can be ( )1sp cs g+ - >  or ( )1sp cs g+ - £ . If ( )1 0sp c s g> - - > , 
then the analysis of ep  is identical to case a.1:  
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- if ( ) ( )2 11
1
cs
s s
cs
c p p
s g q
s g
q
-
- - < £ -
-
% , ep  has a maximum point ( )**e epp  and the 
argmax is given by **e ep p= ; 
- if 
( )2 1
1
cs
s s
cs
p p
s g q
q
-
> -
-
% , ep  has a superior and not a mximum point; 
if instead ( )0 1sp c s g£ £ - - , then ep  is represented only by the half line 0ep =  for [ ),ep cÎ ¥ . 
In this case, the profit function ep  is constant and in correspondence of each value [ ),ep cÎ ¥ , ep  
reaches its maximum value (zero). For each value of sp  such that ( )0 1sp c s g£ £ - - , the argmax 
of ep  is represented by the interval [ ),c ¥ . 
 
The reaction function of firm e is then represented by the following expressions. 
 
If ( )1 0c s g- - £ : 
( ) ( )** 2 1      if  0
1
cs
e s e s s
cs
p p p p p
s g q
q
-
= £ £ -
-
% . 
If ( )1 0c s g- - > : 
( )
[ ) ( )
( ) ( )**
,   if  0 1
2 1
      if  1
1
s
e s cs
e s s
cs
c p c
p p
p c p p
s g
s g q
s g
q
¥ £ £ - -ì
ï
= í -
- - < £ -ï -î
%
. 
 
 
Firm s: analysis and reaction funtion 
The profit function sp  is composed by four separate functions: 
 
- ( ){ }  if  0 max 0, 1s s ep p p s g£ £ - - , which is represented by a segment increasing with respect 
of sp  if ( ){ } ( )max 0, 1 1e ep ps g s g- - = - - , or by the point ( ) ( ), 0,0s sp p =  if 
( ){ }max 0, 1 0ep s g- - = . 
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- ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1   if  max 0, 11
e s
s cs cs e s e
p p
p p p pq q s g
s g
é ù-
+ - - - < <ê ú-ë û
, which is represented by a section 
of a concave parabola intersecting the horizontal axis sp  at 
( )1
0,
1
cs
s e
cs
p p
q s g
q
-
= +
-
 and whose 
argmax is given by 
( )** 11
2 1
cs
s e
cs
p p
q s g
q
é ù-
= +ê ú-ë û
. 
 
-   if  
2
cs
s s ep p p
q = , which is represented by the point ( ), ,
2
cs
s s e ep p p
qp
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
. 
  
- 0  if  s s ep pp = > , which is represented by an half line. 
 
Case (a.1): firm s 
If ( )1ep s g> -  (i.e. ( ){ } ( )max 0, 1 1e ep ps g s g- - = - - ), the segment sp  intersects the 
parabola at points 0sp =  and ( )1s ep p s g= - - . The intersection ( )1s ep p s g= - -  lies on the 
increasing side of the parabola if 
( ) **1e sp ps g- - < Û ( )
( ) ( )** 111 1
2 1
cs
e s e
cs
p p p
q s g
s g s g
q
é ù-
< + - = + + -ê ú-ë û
Û  
Û
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
e
cs
p
q s g
q
- -
<
-
. 
while it lies on the maximum point of the parabola if 
( ) **1e sp ps g- - = Û
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
e
cs
p
q s g
q
- -
=
-
 
and on its decreasing side if  
( ) **1e sp ps g- - > Û
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
e
cs
p
q s g
q
- -
>
-
. 
In correspondence of s ep p= , the value assumed by sp  is always lower than the value assumed by 
the parabola: 
( ) ( ) ( )12 1
cs e s
s s e s s cs cs
p p
p p p p
q
p q q
s g
é ù-
= = < + -ê ú-ë û
Û
2
cs
e e csp p
q q<  
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In figure 3.1.2, we represent the four components of sp  when ( )1ep s g> -  and 
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
e
cs
p
q s g
q
- -
<
-
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.2 
 
If 
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
e
cs
p
q s g
q
- -
<
-
 (as in figure 3.1.2), then: 
- if **e sp p£ , profit function sp  has only a superior given by the value assumed by the 
parabola in s ep p= , e csp q ; 
- if instead **e sp p> , then sp  has a maximum point given by the maximum of the parabola 
( )**s spp  and the argmax is given by **sp .  
If instead 
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
e
cs
p
q s g
q
- -
³
-
, sp  has a maximum point given by ( )1s ep p s g= - -  because 
the segment sp  intersects the parabola on its decreasing side (or on its maximum point). 
Now, since 
( )** 1
1
cs
e s e
cs
p p p
q s g
q
-
> Û >
-
 
and 
**
sp  
( )**s spp  
sp  
sp  0  
( )1ep s g- -  
sp  
2
cs
sp
q  
( )1
1
cs
e
cs
p
q s g
q
-
+
-
 
                                
ep
144424443  
( )
( )
1
2 1
cs
e
cs
p
q s g
q
-
+
-
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( ) ( ) ( )2 11
1 1
cscs
cs cs
q s gq s g
q q
- --
<
- -
, 
to build the reaction function of firm s, there are three relevant cases to study: 
i. 
( ) ( )2 1
max ,
1
cs
e
cs
p c
q s g
q
ì ü- -ï ï³ í ý-ï ïî þ
; 
ii. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 11max 1 , , max ,
1 1
cscs
e
cs cs
c p c
q s gq s g
s g
q q
ì ü- -ì ü- ï ï- < <í ý í ý- -î þ ï ïî þ
; and 
iii. ( ){ } ( ) ( )1max 1 , max 1 , ,
1
cs
e
cs
c p c
q s g
s g s g
q
ì ü-
- < £ -í ý-î þ
. 
 
i. If 
( ) ( )2 1
max ,
1
cs
e
cs
p c
q s g
q
ì ü- -ï ï³ í ý-ï ïî þ
, sp  has a maximum point given by ( )1s ep p s g= - - . 
ii. If ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 11max 1 , , max ,
1 1
cscs
e
cs cs
c p c
q s gq s g
s g
q q
ì ü- -ì ü- ï ï- < <í ý í ý- -î þ ï ïî þ
, we are in the case in which 
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
e
cs
p
q s g
q
- -
<
-
 and **e sp p> , i.e. the profit function sp  has a maximum point given by the 
maximum of the parabola ( )**s spp  and the argmax is given by **sp . 
iii. If ( ){ } ( ) ( )1max 1 , max 1 , ,
1
cs
e
cs
c p c
q s g
s g s g
q
ì ü-
- < £ -í ý-î þ
, we are in the case in which 
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
e
cs
p
q s g
q
- -
<
-
 and **e sp p£ , i.e. the profit function sp  has only a superior given by the 
value assumed by the parabola in s ep p= , e csp q . 
 
Case (a.2): firm s 
If ( )1ep s g£ -  (i.e. ( ){ }max 0, 1 0ep s g- - = ), sp  is represented only by a section of the 
parabola, the point ( ), ,
2
cs
s s e ep p p
qp
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
 and the half line 0sp = . Then in order to build the 
reaction function of firm s, there are two relevant cases to study: 
i. ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1max min 1 , , max 1 ,
1
cs
e
cs
c p c
q s g
s g s g
q
ì üì ü-ï ï- < £ -í í ý ý-ï ïî þî þ
; 
 17 
ii. ( ) ( )1max min 1 , ,
1
cs
e
cs
c p c
q s g
s g
q
ì üì ü-ï ï£ £ -í í ý ý-ï ïî þî þ
. 
 
i. If ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1max min 1 , , max 1 ,
1
cs
e
cs
c p c
q s g
s g s g
q
ì üì ü-ï ï- < £ -í í ý ý-ï ïî þî þ
, we are in the case in which 
**
e sp p> , i.e. the profit function sp  has a maximum point given by the maximum of the parabola 
( )**s spp  and the argmax is given by **sp . 
ii. If ( ) ( )1max min 1 , ,
1
cs
e
cs
c p c
q s g
s g
q
ì üì ü-ï ï£ £ -í í ý ý-ï ïî þî þ
, we are in the case in which **e sp p£ , i.e. the 
profit function sp  has only a superior given by the value assumed by the parabola in s ep p= , 
e csp q . 
 
The reaction function of firm s is then represented by the following expression 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
** 2 11                      if  max 1 , , max ,
1 1
2 1
1       if  max ,
1
cscs
s e
cs cs
s e
cs
e e
cs
p c p c
p p
p p c
q s gq s g
s g
q q
q s g
s g
q
ì ì ü- -ì ü- ï ïï - < <í ý í ý- -ï î þ ï ïî þï= í
ì ü- -ï ï ï- - ³ í ýï -ï ïï î þî
. 
 
Then, we can conclude that: 
 
Lemma 1: Equilibrium Results – Second Stage – case (a). In case (a), at the second stage of the 
game: 
® if cost c is higher than ( ) ( )2 1 1cs csq s g q- - -  (and for each ( )0,1csq Î ), it exists a unique 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium where firm s practices ( )* 1sp c s g= - -  and firm e *ep c= ; 
equilibrium profits are * 0ep =  and ( )* 1 0s cp s g= - - >  (firm s gains the entire market). 
® if cost c is lower than ( ) ( )2 1 1cs csq s g q- - - , the equilibrium results depend on both the size 
of the convinced standard consumers’ group and c. In particular 
- If 0 7 3 5 2csq< < -  (with a small number of convinced standard consumers) or if 
7 3 5 2 1csq- £ <  and  
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( ) ( ) ( )( )1 3 1 1 2
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - -
£ <
- -
 
it exists a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium where firm e and s shares the market, practice 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
* *
2 1 1 2 1 1 1
, ,
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs cs
e s
cs cs
c c
p p
q s g q q s g q
q q
æ ö- + - - - + - +
= ç ÷ç ÷- -è ø
 
and gain 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
* *
1 1 2 1 1 1
, ,
9 1 1 9 1 1
cs cs cs cs
e s
cs cs
c cq s g q q s g q
p p
q s g q s g
æ öé ù é ù- + - - - + - +ë û ë ûç ÷=
ç ÷- - - -ç ÷
è ø
. 
-  If instead 7 3 5 2 1csq- £ < and 
( ) ( )1 3 1
0
1
cs cs
cs
c
s g q q
q
- - -
< <
-
, it doesn’t exists any 
equilibrium in pure strategy. 
 
Proof. 
See the Appendix. 
 
The interpretation of results is the following: when adopting the SRL increase “too much” the cost 
of production of ethical firm, all the potentially ethical consumers prefer buying the standard good, 
profits of ethical firm are equal to zero for each price adopted by the standard firm and the standard 
firm behaves as a monopolist on the entire market, if adopting the SRL does not increase “too 
much” the cost of production, the equilibrium results depend also on the number of convinced 
standard consumers:  
- if the share of the convinced standard consumers is lower than a given small positive value, then it 
exists a unique equilibrium where both firm adopts a positive price, a group of the potentially 
ethical consumers becomes standard and the remaining ethical, firms share the market and both 
earns a positive profit; 
- if instead the share of the convinced standard consumers is higher than the small positive value, 
the previous equilibrium exists if and only if the cost of SRL lies into an interval where the upper 
bound is given by that value in correspondence of which adopting the SRL increase “too much” the 
cost of production of ethical firm, while the lower bound is a positive value; if cost of SRL is lower 
than the lower bound, the price at which standard firm is able to maximize its profits is such that 
firm e is unable to maximize its profits. 
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Case (b) – Stage 2 
In case (b), firms’ competition is exactly the same as in a traditional Bertrand Duopoly with 
symmetric marginal costs (the second stage of the game is, in fact, identical to the traditional 
Bertrand Duopoly Game). Then, we can conclude that: 
 
Lemma 2: Equilibrium Results – Second Stage – case (b). In case (b), at the second stage of the 
game, it exists a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium: 
® If both firms choose to adopt the SRL, each firm i adopts an equilibrium price *ip c= , i I" Î . 
® If both firms choose not to adopt the SRL, each firm i adopts an equilibrium price * 0ip = , 
i I" Î . 
® In both cases, each firm i obtains an equilibrium profit * 0ip = , i I" Î . 
 
Proof. 
See Tirole (1988). 
 
 
3.2 First Stage and Sub-Game Perfect Equilibria 
In the first Stage of the game, each firm i chooses, simultaneously and independently, if adopting or 
not the SRL (i.e. the marginal costs of production): { }0,ic c= .  
Since we are looking for a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium, we have to analyze the following 
three cases: 
®  
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
cs
c
q s g
q
- -
³
-
 and ( )0,1csq" Î ; 
® 
7 3 5
0
2cs
q
-
< <  and 
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
cs
c
q s g
q
- -
<
-
, or 
7 3 5
1
2 cs
q
-
£ <  and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 3 1 1 2
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - -
£ <
- -
; and 
® 
7 3 5
1
2 cs
q
-
£ <  and 
( ) ( )1 3 1
0
1
cs cs
cs
c
s g q q
q
- - -
< <
-
. 
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If 
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
cs
c
q s g
q
- -
³
-
 and ( )0,1csq" Î , we have that the choice at the first stage is represented 
by the following 2x2 matrix (figure 3.2.1) where each firm (firm 1 and 2) can choose if adopting or 
not the SRL. The payoffs are represented by the equilibrium profits obtainable by the two firms at 
the second stage of the game. 
 
 Firm 2 
 srl (e)  not srl (s) 
srl (e) 
 
0 , 0 0 , >0  
 
Firm 1 not srl (s) 
 
>0 , 0 0 , 0 
 
Figure 3.2.1 
 
Observing the matrix, we can conclude that there are two asymmetric Subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibria:  
- ( ) ( )1,2 ,s e= , ( ) ( )* *1 2, 0,c c c= , ( ) ( )( )* *1 2, 1 ,p p c cs g= - -  with ( ) ( )( )* *1 2, 1 ,0cp p s g= - - ; and 
- ( ) ( )1,2 ,e s= , ( ) ( )* *1 2, ,0c c c= , ( ) ( )( )* *1 2, , 1p p c c s g= - -  with ( ) ( )( )* *1 2, 0, 1cp p s g= - - . 
 
If 
7 3 5
0
2cs
q
-
< <  and 
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
cs
c
q s g
q
- -
<
-
, or 
7 3 5
1
2 cs
q
-
£ <  and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 3 1 1 2
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - -
£ <
- -
, the choice at the first stage is represented by the 
following 2x2 matrix (figure 3.2.2) 
 
 Firm 2 
 srl (e) not srl (s) 
srl (e) 
 
0 , 0 >0 , >0  
 
Firm 1 not srl (s) 
 
>0 , >0 0 , 0 
 
 
Figure 3.2.2 
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As in the previous case, there are two asymmetric Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria where:  
- ( ) ( )1,2 ,s e= , ( ) ( )* *1 2, 0,c c c= , with 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
* *
1 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 2
, ,
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cs
c c
p p
q s g q q s g q
q q
æ ö- + - + - + - -
= ç ÷ç ÷- -è ø
 and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
* *
1 2
1 1 1 1 1 2
, ,
9 1 1 9 1 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cs
c cq s g q q s g q
p p
q s g q s g
æ öé ù é ù- + - + - + - -ë û ë ûç ÷=
ç ÷- - - -ç ÷
è ø
; 
- ( ) ( )1,2 ,e s= , ( ) ( )* *1 2, ,0c c c=  with 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
* *
1 2
2 1 1 2 1 1 1
, ,
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cs
c c
p p
q s g q q s g q
q q
æ ö- + - - - + - +
= ç ÷ç ÷- -è ø
 and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
* *
1 2
1 1 2 1 1 1
, ,
9 1 1 9 1 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cs
c cq s g q q s g q
p p
q s g q s g
æ öé ù é ù- + - - - + - +ë û ë ûç ÷=
ç ÷- - - -ç ÷
è ø
. 
 
If, finally, 
7 3 5
1
2 cs
q
-
£ <  and 
( ) ( )1 3 1
0
1
cs cs
cs
c
s g q q
q
- - -
< <
-
, firms are indifferent between 
choosing both to be or not to be ethical: in both cases, firms obtain zero equilibrium profits; in fact, 
no equilibrium in the second stage exists if firms make different choices on the SRL. Then, there 
are two Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibria given by: 
- ( ) ( )1,2 ,s s= , ( ) ( )* *1 2, 0,0c c = , ( ) ( )* *1 2, 0,0p p =  with ( ) ( )* *1 2, 0,0p p = ; and 
- ( ) ( )1,2 ,e e= , ( ) ( )* *1 2, ,c c c c= , ( ) ( )* *1 2, ,p p c c=  with ( ) ( )* *1 2, 0,0p p = . 
 
By the previous analysis we can conclude that 
 
Proposition 1: Equilibrium Results. If cost c is higher than ( ) ( )2 1 1cs csq s g q- - -  (and for each 
( )0,1csq Î ), the two-stage game has two asymmetric subgame perfect Nash Equilibria where one of 
the two firms chooses to be ethical and the other standard; if cost c is lower than 
( ) ( )2 1 1cs csq s g q- - - ,  equilibrium results depend on both the size of the convinced standard 
consumers’ group and c:  
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® with a very small number of convinced standard consumers ( 0 7 3 5 2csq< < - ), the two-stage 
game has two asymmetric subgame perfect Nash Equilibria where one of the two firms chooses to 
be ethical and the other standard; 
® if the number of convinced standard consumers is 7 3 5 2 1csq- £ < , the two-stage game has 
two asymmetric subgame perfect Nash Equilibria (where one of the two firms chooses to be ethical 
and the other standard) if and only if cost c belongs to the interval 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 3 1 1 2
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - -
£ <
- -
; 
if instead cost c is 
( ) ( )1 3 1
0
1
cs cs
cs
c
s g q q
q
- - -
< <
-
 
the two-stage game has two symmetric subgame perfect Nash Equilibria where both firms chooses 
to be ethical or standard. 
Proof. 
See above. 
 
In figure 3.2.3, we represent the areas in which the game has two asymmetric Sub-Game Perfect 
Nash Equilibria and two symmetric Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.3 
1 0 
( )2 1s g -  
c 
csq  
7 3 5
2
-  
N.E.: s and e 
N.E.: s and e 
N.E. 
s and s 
or 
e and e 
( )( )1 2
1
cs
c s
s g q
q
- -
-
 
( )( )1 3 1
1
cs cs
c s
s g q q
q
- - -
-
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Assuming that the proportions of convinced standard and potentially ethical consumers’ groups are 
not fixed a priori (as in Davies, 2005), equilibrium results differ from Davies (2005)’s ones: if 
7 3 5
1
2 cs
q
-
£ <  and 
( ) ( )1 3 1
0
1
cs cs
cs
c
s g q q
q
- - -
< <
-
 
both firms may choose, in equilibrium, to be ethical. If this condition on parameters is satisfied, 
ethical labeling may be seen as a method to obtain a market in which both firms choose to be 
ethical. In particular we can show that 
 
Proposition 2: Sufficient Conditions to eliminate standard production. If 7 3 5 2 1csq- £ <  and 
( ) ( )0 1 3 1 1cs cs csc s g q q q< < - - - - , an institution can eliminate standard production 
transfering any strictly positive sum of money to the firms who choose to adopt the SRL at the first 
stage of the game. 
Proof. 
When 7 3 5 2 1csq- £ <  and ( ) ( )0 1 3 1 1cs cs csc s g q q q< < - - - - , the game has two 
symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria. This means that, at the first stage of the game, each 
firm makes the same choice: both adopt the SRL or both doesn’t do it. To obtain a coordination on 
the adoption of the SRL (i.e. to eliminate standard production), it is sufficient that an institution 
transfers even one euro to the firms who chooses to adopt the SRL at the first stage of the game. 
Choosing to adopt or not the SRL, firms obtain zero equilibrium profits. Giving any strictly positive 
sum of money to the firms who chooses to adopt the SRL, both firms finds it convenient to adopt 
the SRL at the first stage since 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
1 1
* *
2 2
0 1
0 1
s e
s e
p p
p p
= < =
= < =
. 
Q.E.D. 
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4 COMPARATIVE STATICS 
 
In this section we analyze the differences between the equilibrium results in the three relevant 
cases: 
1) 
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
cs
c
q s g
q
- -
³
-
 and each ( )0,1csq Î ; 
2) 
7 3 5
0
2cs
q
-
< <  and 
( ) ( )2 1
1
cs
cs
c
q s g
q
- -
<
-
 or 
7 3 5
1
2 cs
q
-
£ <  and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 3 1 1 2
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - -
£ <
- -
; 
3) 
7 3 5
1
2 cs
q
-
£ <  and 
( ) ( )1 3 1
0
1
cs cs
cs
c
s g q q
q
- - -
< <
-
. 
 
 
CASE 1 
If cost c is higher than ( ) ( )2 1 1cs csq s g q- - -  (and for each ( )0,1csq Î ), the two-stage game has 
two asymmetric subgame perfect Nash Equilibria where one of the two firms chooses to be ethical 
and the other standard, equilibrium prices are 
( )
*
*
0
1 0
e
s
p c
p c s g
= >
= - - >
  
with 
* *
e sp p> , 
equilibrium quantities sold by the two firms are 
*
*
0
1
e
s
q
q
=
=
 and 
equilibrium profits are 
( )
*
*
0
1 0
e
s c
p
p s g
=
= - - >
  
with 
* *
e sp p< . 
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At equilibrium, each consumer becomes standard (i.e. buy a standard good) and obtains an utility 
( )1j su p c cs s s g sg= - = - + - = -  
which is decreasing in c and increasing in s  and g . 
 
To sum up we have that 
 
Proposition 3. If cost c is higher than ( ) ( )2 1 1cs csq s g q- - -  (and for each ( )0,1csq Î ), at 
equilibrium, standard firm obtains the entire market, behaves as a monopolist and obtains a positive 
profit, while ethical firm obtains zero demand, zero equilibrium profit and practices a price equal to 
its marginal costs. All the consumers become standard and obtains an utility ( )ju s csg= - , which 
is decreasing in c and increasing in s  and g . 
 
Proof. 
See above. 
 
 
CASE 2 
If 0 7 3 5 2csq< < -  and 
( ) ( )1 2
1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
<
-
 or 7 3 5 2 1csq- £ <  and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 3 1 1 2
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - -
£ <
- -
 the two-stage game has two asymmetric subgame 
perfect Nash Equilibria where one of the two firms chooses to be ethical and the other standard, 
equilibrium prices are 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
*
*
2 1 1 2
3 1
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
e
cs
cs cs
s
cs
c
p
c
p
q s g q
q
q s g q
q
- + - -
=
-
- + - +
=
-
 
with 
* *
e sp p> Û
( ) ( )1 2 1
1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
>
-
. 
Then, if 
1
2cs
q £  
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( ) ( )1 2 1
1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
>
-
 is always satisfied since 
( ) ( )1 2 1
0
1
cs
cs
s g q
q
- -
£
-
, 
if instead 
1
2cs
q >  
( ) ( )1 2 1
0
1
cs
cs
s g q
q
- -
>
-
 
and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 3 11 2 1
1 1
cs cscs
cs cs
s g q qs g q
q q
- - -- -
<
- -
 
then  
( ) ( )1 2 1
1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
>
-
 
is always satisfied in the interval 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 3 1 1 2
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - -
£ <
- -
 
Equilibrium quantities sold by the two firms are 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
*
*
1 2 1
3 1
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
e
cs cs
s
c
q
c
q
s g q q
s g
s g q q
s g
- - - -
=
-
- + - -
=
-
 
with 
( ) ( )* * 1
2e s cs
q q q> £ Û < ³ . 
 
Equilibrium profits are equal to 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
*
2
*
1 1 2
0
9 1 1
1 1 1
0
9 1 1
cs cs
e
cs
cs cs
s
cs
c
c
q s g q
p
q s g
q s g q
p
q s g
é ù- + - -ë û= >
- -
é ù- + - +ë û= >
- -
 
with 
( ) ( )
( )
* * 1 1 2
2 1
cs
e s
cs
c
s g q
p p
q
- -
> Û <
-
. 
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In particular 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )1 1 2 1 2
12 1
cs cs
cscs
s g q s g q
qq
- - - -
<
--
 
and 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )1 3 11 1 2
12 1
cs cscs
cscs
s g q qs g q
qq
- - -- -
>
--
Û  
Û
1
4cs
q < . 
Then, if 0 7 3 5 2csq< < - , 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
* * 1 1 2
2 1
cs
e s
cs
c
s g q
p p
q
- -
> £ Û < ³
-
. 
If instead 7 3 5 2 1 4csq- £ < ,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
* *
1 3 1 1 1 2
1 2 1
cs cs cs
e s
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
p p
q q
- - - - -
> Û £ <
- -
 
and 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
* * 1 1 2 1 2
2 1 1
cs cs
e s
cs cs
c
s g q s g q
p p
q q
- - - -
£ Û £ <
- -
. 
If, finally, 1 4 1csq£ < , 
* *
e sp p£   
because 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 2
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
³
-
 
is always satisfied. 
 
Finally, at equilibrium, all the convinced standard consumers become standard and gain an utility 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
j
cs
c
u s
q s g q
s
q
- + - +
= -
-
, 
all the potentially ethical consumers s.t.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 1 2
1
3 1
cs csj
cs
cq s s g q
g
s q
- + + - -
< <
-
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become standard and obtain an utility of 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
j
cs
c
u s
q s g q
s
q
- + - +
= -
-
 and 
all the potentially ethical consumers s.t. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 1 2
3 1
cs cs j
cs
cq s s g q
g g
s q
- + + - -
< <
-
 
become ethical (i.e. buy an ethical good) and gain an utility of 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 1 1 2
3 1
cs csj
j
cs
c
u e
q s g q
g s
q
- + - -
= -
-
. 
( )ju s  is decreasing in c and increasing in g  and s , while ( )ju e  is decreasing in c and increasing 
in jg , g  and s . Depending on the values of g  and c, ju  is increasing or decreasing in csq . 
 
To sum up we have that 
 
Proposition 4. If 0 7 3 5 2csq< < -  and 
( ) ( )1 2
1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
<
-
 or 7 3 5 2 1csq- £ <  and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 3 1 1 2
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - -
£ <
- -
, at equilibrium, standard and ethical firms sell 
respectively a quantity *sq  and 
*
eq , where ( ) ( )* *
1
2e s cs
q q q> £ Û < ³ , practice a price *sp  and 
*
ep , 
with * *s ep p< , and obtain a positive profit 
*
ep  and 
*
sp , where 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
* * 1 1 2
2 1
cs
e s
cs
c
s g q
p p
q
- -
> £ Û < ³
-
 if 0 1 4csq< £  
and 
* *
e sp p£  if 1 4 1csq£ < . 
A share of the consumers become standard and the remaining ethical, standard consumers obtain an 
utility ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
j
cs
c
u s
q s g q
s
q
- + - +
= -
-
, while ethical consumers obtain 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 1 1 2
3 1
cs csj
j
cs
c
u e
q s g q
g s
q
- + - -
= -
-
. ( )ju s  is decreasing in c and increasing in g  and s , 
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while ( )ju e  is decreasing in c and increasing in jg , g  and s . Depending on the values of g  and 
c, ju  is increasing or decreasing in csq . 
Proof. 
See above. 
 
CASE 3 
If 7 3 5 2 1csq- £ <  and 
( ) ( )1 3 1
0
1
cs cs
cs
c
s g q q
q
- - -
< <
-
 the two-stage game has two symmetric 
subgame perfect Nash Equilibria where both firms choose to be ethical or standard, equilibrium 
prices are 
*
1
*
2
p c
p c
=
=
  
if both firms choose to be ethical and 
*
1
*
2
0
0
p
p
=
=
 
if both firms choose to be standard; in both cases 
* *
1 2p p= . 
Equilibrium quantities sold by the two firms are 
*
1
*
2
1
2
1
2
q
q
=
=
 
with 
* *
1 2q q= . 
 
Equilibrium profits are equal to 
*
1
*
2
0
0
p
p
=
=
 
with 
* *
1 2p p= . 
 
Finally, at equilibrium, all the consumers becomes standard and gains an utility 
 30 
( )ju s s=  
if both firms chooses to be standard, while all the consumers becomes ethical if both firms chooses 
to be ethical and obtains an utility 
( )
( )
       if 
   if 
j cs
j
j pe
u e c j
u e c j
s q
g s q
= - Î
= - Î
 
where potentially ethical consumers obtain a higher utility than convinced standard consumers 
j c cg s s- > - . 
 
( )ju s  is increasing in s , while ( )ju e  is decreasing in c and increasing in s  if csj qÎ  and ( )ju e  
is decreasing in c and increasing in s  and jg  if pej qÎ . 
 
Moreover 
- convinced standard consumers earn a higher utility if both firms chooses to be standard: 
( ) ( ) j ju s c u es s= > - = ; and 
- potentially ethical consumers earn a higher utility if both firms chooses to be ethical 
( ) ( )jj ju s c u es g s= < - = Û j
c
c
s
g
+
>  while 
( ) ( )jj ju s c u es g s= ³ - = Û j
c
c
s
g
+
£ . 
 
To sum up we have that 
 
Proposition 5. If 7 3 5 2 1csq- £ <  and 
( ) ( )1 3 1
0
1
cs cs
cs
c
s g q q
q
- - -
< <
-
, at equilibrium, firms 
shares equally the market, * *1 2
1
2
q q= = , practice the same price * * *1 2p p p= = , with 
* 0p =  if both 
firms chooses to be standard and *p c=  if both chooses to be ethical. Both firms obtains zero 
equilibrium profits * *1 2 0p p= = . All the consumers becomes standard and gains an utility 
( )ju s s=  if both firms chooses to be standard, while all the consumers become ethical if both 
firms chooses to be ethical and obtains an utility ( )   if j csu e c js q= - Î  and 
( )  if jj peu e c jg s q= - Î . ( )ju s  is increasing in s , while ( )ju e  is decreasing in c and increasing 
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in s  if csj qÎ  and ( )ju e  is decreasing in c and increasing in s  and jg  if pej qÎ . Convinced 
standard consumers obtain a higher utility when both firms choose to be standard while potentially 
ethical consumers may obtain a higher utility when both firms chooses to be ethical: if j c cg s> +  
then potentially ethical consumers gains more with two ethical firms, while if j c cg s£ +  then 
potentially ethical consumers earn more with two standard firms. 
 
Proof. 
See above. 
 
 
We conclude this section analyzing which of the three cases is the best for firms in terms of 
equilibrium profits and the best for consumers in terms of utilities. 
 
 
The best case for firms 
 
Firm e 
Case 2 is the best case for firm e and, in particular, 
( ) ( ) ( )* * * 2  1  3 0e e ecase case casep p p> = = . 
Firm s 
The worst case for firm s is case 3 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
* *
 3  1
 3  2
s s
s s
case case
case case
p p
p p
<
<
 
while firm s obtains the highest equilibrium profits in case 1 if and only if 
( ) ( )* * 1  2 0s scase casep p- ³ Û  
Û
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 13 3 13 2 1 13 3 13 2
2 1 2 1
cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q s g q
q q
- - - - + -
£ £
- -
 
while 
( ) ( )* * 1  2 0s scase casep p- < Û  
Û
( ) ( )
( )
1 13 3 13 2
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- + -
>
-
 and 
( ) ( )
( )
1 13 3 13 2
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- - -
<
-
 
Now since 
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( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 13 3 13 2 1 13 3 13 21 2
12 1 2 1
cs cscs
cscs cs
s g q s g qs g q
qq q
- - - - + -- -
< <
-- -
 
and 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )1 3 11 13 3 13 2
12 1
cs cscs
cscs
s g q qs g q
qq
- - -- - -
³ Û
--
 
2
15 3 13
0.48
6cs
q
æ ö-
Û £ @ç ÷
è ø
, 
we have that:  
- if we are in case 1, equilibrium profit of firm s in case 1 is the highest profit of the three cases - 
( ) ( )* * 1  2s scase casep p>  - if and only if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 13 3 13 21 2
1 2 1
cscs
cs cs
c
s g qs g q
q q
- + -- -
£ <
- -
 
while if 
( ) ( )
( )
1 13 3 13 2
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- + -
³
-
 
we have that 
( ) ( )* * 1  2s scase casep p£ ; 
 
- if we are in case 2, we have that 
® if 0 7 3 5 2csq< < - , firm s obtains the highest equilibrium profit in case 2 - 
( ) ( )* * 2  1s scase casep p>  - if and only if 
( ) ( )
( )
1 13 3 13 2
0
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- - -
< <
-
 
while ( ) ( )* * 2  1s scase casep p£  if  
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )1 13 3 13 2 1 2
12 1
cs cs
cscs
c
s g q s g q
qq
- - - - -
£ <
--
; 
® if 
2
15 3 13
7 3 5 2
6cs
q
æ ö-
- £ £ ç ÷
è ø
, firm s obtains the highest equilibrium profit in case 2 - 
( ) ( )* * 2  1s scase casep p>  - if and only if 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 1 13 3 13 2
1 2 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - - -
£ <
- -
 
while ( ) ( )* * 2  1s scase casep p£  if  
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )1 13 3 13 2 1 2
12 1
cs cs
cscs
c
s g q s g q
qq
- - - - -
£ <
--
; 
® if 
2
15 3 13
1
6 cs
q
æ ö-
< <ç ÷
è ø
, firm s, in case 2, obtains always an equilibrium profit lower than the 
equilibrium profit of case 1 - ( ) ( )* * 2  1s scase casep p< , since 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )1 3 11 13 3 13 2
12 1
cs cscs
cscs
s g q qs g q
qq
- - -- - -
<
--
. 
 
 
 
The best case for consumers 
 
CASE 1 
 
Case 1 with respect of case 3 
In case 1, each consumer obtains an utility which is always greater than the utility obtained by 
consumers in case 3 if both firms choose to be ethical: 
( ) 1 jju case c c cgs g s s= - > - > - ; 
if instead, in case 3, firms choose to be standard, in case 1, consumers obtain a lower utility than the 
utility obtained by consumers in case 3, since in case 1 we have ( )1c s g³ -  
( ) ( ) 1 1ju case c cgs s s g= - > Û < - . 
 
Case 1 with respect of case 2 
In case 1, each consumer obtains a lower utility than the utility obtained by ethical consumers in 
case 2 because 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 1 1 2
 1 ,  2
3 1
cs csj
j j
cs
c
u case c u e case
q s g q
gs g s
q
- + - -
= - < - = Û
-
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
c
c
q s g q
gs g s
q
- + - -
- < - Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1 1 2
3 1
1 3 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
cs csj
cs
c
c
c
q s g q
gs g s
q
q sg s g q
g
s q
- + - -
Û - < - Û
-
- - + - -
Û >
-
 
is always verified: in fact jg  is such that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 1 2
3 1
cs cs j
cs
cq s s g q
g g
s q
- + + - -
< <
-
 
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 2 1 3 1 1 2
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cs
c cq sg s g q q s s g q
s q s q
- - + - - - + + - -
£ Û
- -
 
( ) ( )1 2
1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
Û ³
-
 
then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
cq sg s g q
g
s q
- - + - -
>
-
 
is always satisfied. 
 
Finally in case 1, each consumer obtains a lower or equal utility than the utility obtained by 
standard consumers in case 2 because 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1 1
 1 ,  2
3 1
cs cs
j j
cs
c
u case c u s case
q s g q
gs s
q
- + - +
= - £ - = Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
cs
c
c
q s g q
gs s
q
- + - +
- £ - Û
-
 
( ) ( )1 2
1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
Û ³
-
. 
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CASE 2 
 
Case 2 with respect of case 1 
In case 2, each ethical consumer obtains a lower utility than the utility obtained by consumers in 
case 1 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 1 1 2
 1 ,  2
3 1
cs csj
j j
cs
c
u case c u e case
q s g q
gs g s
q
- + - -
= - > - = Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
c
c
q s g q
gs g s
q
- + - -
Û - > -
-
 
which is always satisfied since 
0jgs g s- ³  
and 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1 1 2
0
3 1
cs cs
cs
c
c
q s g q
q
- + - -
- <
-
 
because 
( ) ( )1 2
1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
<
-
. 
In case 2, each standard consumer obtains a lower utility than the utility obtained by consumers in 
case 1 since: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1 1
 1 ,  2
3 1
cs cs
j j
cs
c
u case c u s case
q s g q
gs s
q
- + - +
= - > - = Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
cs
c
c
q s g q
gs s
q
- + - +
Û - > - Û
-
 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- +
Û <
-
 
which is always satisfied. 
 
 
Case 2 with respect of case 3 
In case 2, each standard consumer obtains a lower utility than the utility obtained by consumers in 
case 3 when firms choose to be standard 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1 1
 3 ,  2
3 1
cs cs
j j
cs
c
u case u s case
q s g q
s s
q
- + - +
= > - =
-
; and 
each ethical consumers obtains a lower utility than the utility obtained by consumers in case 3 when 
firms choose to be standard if and only if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 1 1 2
 3 ,  2
3 1
cs csj
j j
cs
c
u case u e case
q s g q
s g s
q
- + - -
= > - = Û
-
 
( ) ( )( )
( )
2 1 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
c q s g q
g s s
q
- + - -
Û - < Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2 3 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
cq s s g q
g
s q
- + + - -
Û <
-
 
Now since 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2 3 1 2 1 3 1 1 2
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cs
c cq s s g q q s s g q
s q s q
- + + - - - + + - -
>
- -
 
is always verified, we have that: 
- if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs csj
cs cs
c cq s s g q q s s g q
g
s q s q
- + + - - - + + - -
< <
- -
, 
( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u e case> ; 
- if instead 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2 3 1 2
3 1
cs cs j
cs
cq s s g q
g g
s q
- + + - -
£ <
-
, ( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u e case£ . 
 
 
If, in case 3, firms choose to be ethical, we have that: 
 
- each standard consumer obtains (in case 2) a lower utility than the utility obtained by convinced 
standard consumers in case 3 if and only if 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- +
<
-
 with 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )1 3 1 1 1 1 2
1 12 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cscs
s g q q s g q s g q
q qq
- - - - + - -
< <
- --
: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
1 1 1
 3 ,  2
3 1
cs cs
j j
cs
c
u case c u s case
q s g q
s s
q
- + - +
= - > - = Û
-
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1 2 1 1 1
0
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cs
c c
c
q s g q q s g q
q q
- + - + - - - +
Û - = < Û
- -
 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- +
Û <
-
 
if instead 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- +
³
-
 
we have that ( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u s case£ . 
 
- each standard consumer obtains a lower utility than the utility obtained by potentially ethical 
consumers in case 3 if and only if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1 1
 3 ,  2
3 1
cs csj
j j
cs
c
u case c u s case
q s g q
g s s
q
- + - +
= - > - = Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2 3 1 1
3 1
cs csj
cs
cq s s g q
g
s q
- + + - +
Û >
-
 
Now since 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1 2 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 2
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cs
c cq s s g q q s s g q
s q s q
- + + - + - + + - -
>
- -
 
we have that: 
if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2 3 1 1
3 1
cs cs j
cs
cq s s g q
g g
s q
- + + - +
< <
-
, ( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u s case> ,  
if instead 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 1
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs csj
cs cs
c cq s s g q q s s g q
g
s q s q
- + + - - - + + - +
< £
- -
, 
( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u s case£ . 
 
- each ethical consumer obtains a lower utility than the utility obtained by convinced standard 
consumers in case 3 if and only if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 1 1 2
 3 ,  2
3 1
cs csj
j j
cs
c
u case c u e case
q s g q
s g s
q
- + - -
= - > - = Û
-
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
c
c
q s g q
g s s
q
- + - -
Û - < - Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
cq s s g q
g
s q
- - + - -
Û <
-
. 
Now since  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 2 1 3 1 1 2
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cs
c cq s s g q q s s g q
s q s q
- - + - - - + + - -
> Û
- -
 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- +
<
-
 
we have that 
if 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- +
<
-
 and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1 3 1 1 2 1 3 1 2
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs csj
cs cs
c cq s s g q q s s g q
g
s q s q
- + + - - - - + - -
< <
- -
, 
( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u e case>  
if 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- +
<
-
 and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 2
3 1
cs cs j
cs
cq s s g q
g g
s q
- - + - -
£ <
-
, 
( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u e case£ , 
if finally 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- +
³
-
 we have that ( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u e case£ . 
 
- each ethical consumer obtains a lower utility than the utility obtained by potentially ethical 
consumers in case 3 since 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 1 1 2
 3 ,  2
3 1
cs csj j
j j
cs
c
u case c u e case
q s g q
g s g s
q
- + - -
= - > - = Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1 1 2
3 1
cs cs
cs
c
c
q s g q
q
- + - -
Û < Û
-
 
( ) ( )1 2
1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
Û <
-
 
is always satisfied. 
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CASE 3 
 
Case 3 – when both firms chooses to be standard - with respect of case 1 
In case 3, consumers obtain an utility greater than the utility obtained by consumers in case 1 if and 
only if 
( ) ( ) 3  1j ju case c u cases gs= > - = Û  
( )1 cs gÛ - < , 
if instead  
( )1c s g£ -  
we have that ( ) ( ) 3  1j ju case u case£ . 
 
Case 3 – when both firms chooses to be ethical - with respect of case 1 
In case 3, convinced standard consumers obtain an utility lower than the utility obtained by 
consumers in case 1 since 
( ) ( ) 3  1
0
j ju case c c u cases gs
gs s
= - < - = Û
Û - >
 
is always satisfied. 
In case 3, potentially ethical consumers obtain an utility lower or equal than the utility obtained by 
consumers in case 1 since 
( ) ( ) 3  1jj j
j
u case c c u caseg s gs
g s gs
= - £ - = Û
Û £
 
is always satisfied. 
 
 
Case 3 – when both firms chooses to be standard - with respect of case 2 
In case 3, consumers obtain an utility greater than the utility obtained by standard consumers in 
case 2: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1 1
 3 ,  2
3 1
cs cs
j j
cs
c
u case u s case
q s g q
s s
q
- + - +
= > - =
-
 
while consumers obtain an utility greater than the utility obtained by ethical consumers in case 2 if 
and only if 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 1 1 2
 3 ,  2
3 1
cs csj
j j
cs
c
u case u e case
q s g q
s g s
q
- + - -
= > - = Û
-
 
( ) ( )( )
( )
2 1 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
c q s g q
g s s
q
- + - -
Û - < Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2 3 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
cq s s g q
g
s q
- + + - -
Û <
-
. 
Now since 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2 3 1 2 1 3 1 1 2
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cs
c cq s s g q q s s g q
s q s q
- + + - - - + + - -
>
- -
 
we have that 
if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs csj
cs cs
c cq s s g q q s s g q
g
s q s q
- + + - - - + + - -
< <
- -
, 
( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u e case> , 
if instead 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2 3 1 2
3 1
cs cs j
cs
cq s s g q
g g
s q
- + + - -
£ <
-
, ( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u e case£ . 
 
Case 3 – when both firms chooses to be ethical - with respect of case 2 
In case 3, convinced standard consumers obtain an utility greater than the utility obtained by 
standard consumers in case 2: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
1 1 1
 3 ,  2
3 1
cs cs
j j
cs
c
u case c u s case
q s g q
s s
q
- + - +
= - > - = Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
cs
c
c
q s g q
q
- + - +
Û <
-
 
which is always satisfied since 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 1 1
1 2 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - +
£ <
- -
. 
 
In case 3, potentially ethical consumers obtain an utility greater than the utility obtained by 
standard consumers in case 2: 
 41 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
 3 ,  2
3 1
1 1 1
3 1
cs csj
j j
cs
cs csj
cs
c
u case c u s case
c
c
q s g q
g s s
q
q s g q
g s s
q
- + - +
= - > - = Û
-
- + - +
Û - > -
-
 
which is always satisfied since 
0jg s s- >  
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 1 1
1 2 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - +
£ <
- -
. 
 
In case 3, convinced standard consumers obtain an utility greater than the utility obtained by ethical 
consumers in case 2 if and only if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 1 1 2
 3 ,  2
3 1
cs csj
j j
cs
c
u case c u e case
q s g q
s g s
q
- + - -
= - > - = Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
c
c
q s g q
g s s
q
- + - -
Û - < - Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 2
3 1
cs csj
cs
cq s s g q
g
s q
- - + - -
Û <
-
. 
Now since  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 2 1 3 1 1 2
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs cs
cs cs
c cq s s g q q s s g q
s q s q
- - + - - - + + - -
> Û
- -
 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
2 1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- +
<
-
 
which is always satisfied, we have that 
if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1 3 1 1 2 1 3 1 2
3 1 3 1
cs cs cs csj
cs cs
c cq s s g q q s s g q
g
s q s q
- + + - - - - + - -
< <
- -
, 
( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u e case> , 
if instead 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 2
3 1
cs cs j
cs
cq s s g q
g g
s q
- - + - -
£ <
-
, ( ) ( ) 3 ,  2j ju case u e case£ . 
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In case 3, potentially ethical consumers obtain an utility greater than the utility obtained by ethical 
consumers in case 2: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 1 1 2
 3 ,  2
3 1
cs csj j
j j
cs
c
u case c u e case
q s g q
g s g s
q
- + - -
= - > - = Û
-
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1 1 2
3 1
cs cs
cs
c
c
q s g q
q
- + - -
Û <
-
 
which is always satisfied since 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 3 1 1 2
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
- - - - -
£ <
- -
. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we analyzed the same model of Davies (2005) changing one of its assumption. In 
particular, we have assumed that the proportions of convinced standard and potentially ethical 
consumers’ groups are not fixed a priori as in Davies (2005) and we have shown that with this new 
assumption, equilibrium results change: if a particular condition on the model’s parameters is 
satisfied, results of Davies (2005) are not satisfied, i.e. in equilibrium, even with a positive cost of 
the SRL, both firms may choose to be ethical. If that condition on parameters is satisfied, ethical 
labeling may be seen as a method to obtain a market in which both firms choose to be ethical.  
In particular we have found that if the number of convinced standard consumers is elevate and the 
cost of the SRL is positive but lower than a given value, the two-stage game has two symmetric 
subgame perfect Nash Equilibria where both firms may choose to be ethical or standard. The option 
where both firms choose to be ethical is then realizable; however to be sure to eliminate standard 
production the intervention of an institution seems to be necessary: with each strictly positive 
transfer of money to the firms who choose to adopt the SRL, at the first stage of the game, the 
institution guarantees the existence of two ethical firms in a given market, where this is, of course, 
valid if and only if the condition on parameters we found is satisfied. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
We find the equilibria of the second stage when, at the first stage of the game, one firm chooses to 
be ethical and the rival standard. There are seven case to analize, depending on the value of c and 
csq . 
 
1st Case 
If 
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1
1
cs
cs
c
q s g
s g
q
- -
³ > -
-
, the reaction functions of the two firms are: 
( ) ( )1       s e e ep p p ps g= - - "  and 
( )
[ ) ( )
( ) ( )**
,   if  0 1
2 1
      if  1
1
s
e s cs
e s s
cs
c p c
p p
p c p p
s g
s g q
s g
q
¥ £ £ - -ì
ï
= í -
- - < £ -ï -î
%
.  
It exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies given by 
( )
*
* 1
e
s
p c
p c s g
=
= - -
 
where this equilibrium derives from the intersection of ( ) ( )1s e ep p p s g= - -  and ( ) [ ),e sp p c= ¥  
(i.e. 0ep =  for each ep ) and the equilibrium profits of the two firms are 
( )
*
*
0
1 0
e
s c
p
p s g
=
= - - >
. 
 
2nd Case 
If 
1
2cs
q ³  (i.e. 
( ) ( )1 1
1
cs
cs
q s g
s g
q
-
³ -
-
) and 
( ) ( ) ( )2 11
1 1
cscs
cs cs
c
q s gq s g
q q
- --
< <
- -
, the reaction 
functions of the two firms are: 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
** 2 1                      if  
1
2 1
1       if  
1
cs
s e
cs
s e
cs
e e
cs
p c p
p p
p p
q s g
q
q s g
s g
q
ì - -
£ <ï
-ï= í
- -ï
- - ³ï -î
 and 
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( )
[ ) ( )
( ) ( )**
,   if  0 1
2 1
      if  1
1
s
e s cs
e s s
cs
c p c
p p
p c p p
s g
s g q
s g
q
¥ £ £ - -ì
ï
= í -
- - < £ -ï -î
%
. 
It exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
*
*
2 1 1 2
3 1
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
e
cs
cs cs
s
cs
c
p
c
p
q s g q
q
q s g q
q
- + - -
=
-
- + - +
=
-
 
if and only if  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 3 1 2 1
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
q q s g q s g
q q
- - + - - -
£ <
- -
. 
This equilibrium derives from the intersection of ( ) **s e sp p p=  and ( ) **e s ep p p= . 
 
3rd Case 
If 
1
2cs
q ³  (i.e. 
( ) ( )1 1
1
cs
cs
q s g
s g
q
-
³ -
-
) and ( ) ( )11
1
cs
cs
c
q s g
s g
q
-
- < £
-
, the reaction functions of 
the two firms are: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
** 2 11                      if  
1 1
2 1
1       if  
1
cscs
s e
cs cs
s e
cs
e e
cs
p p
p p
p p
q s gq s g
q q
q s g
s g
q
ì - --
£ <ï
- -ï= í
- -ï
- - ³ï -î
 and 
( )
[ ) ( )
( ) ( )**
,   if  0 1
2 1
      if  1
1
s
e s cs
e s s
cs
c p c
p p
p c p p
s g
s g q
s g
q
¥ £ £ - -ì
ï
= í -
- - < £ -ï -î
%
. 
It doesn’t exists any equilibrium in pure strategies. 
 
4th Case 
If 
1
2cs
q ³  (i.e. 
( ) ( )1 1
1
cs
cs
q s g
s g
q
-
³ -
-
) and ( )0 1c s g< £ - , the reaction functions of the two 
firms are: 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
** 2 11                      if  
1 1
2 1
1       if  
1
cscs
s e
cs cs
s e
cs
e e
cs
p p
p p
p p
q s gq s g
q q
q s g
s g
q
ì - --
£ <ï
- -ï= í
- -ï
- - ³ï -î
 and 
( ) ( )** 2 1      if  0
1
cs
e s e s s
cs
p p p p p
s g q
q
-
= £ £ -
-
% . 
It doesn’t exists any equilibrium in pure strategies. 
 
5th Case 
If 
1
2cs
q <  and ( ) ( ) ( )2 11
1
cs
cs
c
q s g
s g
q
- -
- < <
-
, the reaction functions are 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
** 2 1                      if  
1
2 1
1       if  
1
cs
s e
cs
s e
cs
e e
cs
p c p
p p
p p
q s g
q
q s g
s g
q
ì - -
£ <ï
-ï= í
- -ï
- - ³ï -î
 and 
( )
[ ) ( )
( ) ( )**
,   if  0 1
2 1
      if  1
1
s
e s cs
e s s
cs
c p c
p p
p c p p
s g
s g q
s g
q
¥ £ £ - -ì
ï
= í -
- - < £ -ï -î
%
 
It exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
*
*
2 1 1 2
3 1
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
e
cs
cs cs
s
cs
c
p
c
p
q s g q
q
q s g q
q
- + - -
=
-
- + - +
=
-
 
if and only if  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 3 1 2 1
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
q q s g q s g
q q
- - + - - -
£ <
- -
 when 
4 1
9 2cs
q< < . 
For 
4
0
9cs
q< £ , * *,e sp p  is an equilibrium in the relevant interval of c. 
This equilibrium derives from the intersection of ( ) **s e sp p p=  and ( ) **e s ep p p= . 
 
6th Case 
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If 
1
2cs
q <  and 
( ) ( )1 1
1
cs
cs
c
q s g
s g
q
-
< £ -
-
, the reaction functions are 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
** 2 1                      if  
1
2 1
1       if  
1
cs
s e
cs
s e
cs
e e
cs
p c p
p p
p p
q s g
q
q s g
s g
q
ì - -
£ <ï
-ï= í
- -ï
- - ³ï -î
 and 
( ) ( )** 2 1      if  0
1
cs
e s e s s
cs
p p p p p
s g q
q
-
= £ £ -
-
% . 
It exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
*
*
2 1 1 2
3 1
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
e
cs
cs cs
s
cs
c
p
c
p
q s g q
q
q s g q
q
- + - -
=
-
- + - +
=
-
 
if and only if  
( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1
1
1
cs cs
cs
c
q q s g
s g
q
- - + -
£ £ -
-
 when 
1 4
4 9cs
q£ £ . 
For 
1
0
4cs
q< £ , * *,e sp p  is an equilibrium in the relevant interval of c, while for 
4 1
9 2cs
q< <  it 
doesn’t exists any equilibrium. 
This equilibrium derives from the intersection of ( ) **s e sp p p=  and ( ) **e s ep p p= . 
 
 
7th Case 
If 
1
2cs
q <  and 
( )1
0
1
cs
cs
c
q s g
q
-
< £
-
, the reaction functions are 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
** 2 11                      if  
1 1
2 1
1       if  
1
cscs
s e
cs cs
s e
cs
e e
cs
p p
p p
p p
q s gq s g
q q
q s g
s g
q
ì - --
£ <ï
- -ï= í
- -ï
- - ³ï -î
 and 
( ) ( )** 2 1      if  0
1
cs
e s e s s
cs
p p p p p
s g q
q
-
= £ £ -
-
% . 
 
It exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies given by 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
*
*
2 1 1 2
3 1
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
e
cs
cs cs
s
cs
c
p
c
p
q s g q
q
q s g q
q
- + - -
=
-
- + - +
=
-
 
if and only if  
( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1
1
1
cs cs
cs
c
q q s g
s g
q
- - + -
£ £ -
-
 when 
7 3 5 1
2 4cs
q
-
£ £ . 
For 
7 3 5
0
2cs
q
-
< < , * *,e sp p  is an equilibrium in the relevant interval of c, while for 
1 1
4 2cs
q< <  it 
doesn’t exists any equilibrium. 
This equilibrium derives from the intersection of ( ) **s e sp p p=  and ( ) **e s ep p p= . 
 
 
To sum up we obtain the following results: 
If 
( ) ( )
( )
1 2
1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
³
-
, at the second stage of the game, it exists a unique equilibrium given by 
( )
*
* 1
e
s
p c
p c s g
=
= - -
 
If instead 
( ) ( )
( )
1 2
1
cs
cs
c
s g q
q
- -
<
-
, the existence of an equilibrium, at the second stage of the game 
depends on csq  and c, and the unique equilibrium is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
* **
* **
2 1 1 2
3 1
1 1 1
3 1
cs cs
e e
cs
cs cs
s s
cs
c
p p
c
p p
q s g q
q
q s g q
q
- + - -
= =
-
- + - +
= =
-
 
- If 
7 3 5
0
2cs
q
-
< < , it exists the equilibrium. 
- If 
7 3 5
1
2 cs
q
-
£ < , it exists the equilibrium if and only 
                             
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 3 1 1 2
1 1
cs cs cs
cs cs
c
s g q q s g q
q q
é ù- - - - -ë û £ <
- -
.                                       Q.E.D. 
